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I. Introduction
In 2006, Christopher Norberg visited Dr. Beigel’s chiropractor 
office in San Francisco.1  After the visit, Norberg posted a Yelp 
review in which he stated that Dr. Biegel’s office employed dishonest 
billing practices because they had billed him four times the quoted 
amount.2  Dr. Biegel sued Norberg for defamation, claiming that the 
Yelp review contained false statements of fact.  Dr. Biegel alleged 
that he discussed the additional fees with Norberg, and explained that 
they were to compensate for additional time and effort the office 
spent with insurers.3  Norberg insisted that his statements were 
protected as opinion.4  Eventually, as a result of a court-mandated 
mediation hearing, Norberg replaced the original post with the 
following statement: 
A misunderstanding between both parties led us to act out of 
hand.  I chose to ignore Dr. Biegel’s initial request to discuss 
my posting.  In hindsight, I should have remained open to his 
concerns.  Both Dr. Biegel and I strongly believe in a person’s 
right to express their opinions in a public forum.  We both 
encourage the internet community to act responsibly.5 
Today, many consumers depend on online review sites to guide 
their selection of restaurants, doctors, hairdressers, retail stores, and 
other businesses.  The opinions and experiences shared on these sites 
have the potential to benefit both consumers and businesses; 
consumers are able to make more informed decisions, and popular 
businesses receive free marketing. However, false and dishonest 
reviews can hurt both businesses and consumers.6 
The most common remedy for a false review is a defamation suit. 
The threshold issue in a defamation suit is whether the complaining 
party is a public figure or a private figure.  Whereas public figures 
must prove that a review was posted with actual malice (knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth), private figures have a lower 
1. Elinor Mills, Lawsuit over Yelp Review Settled, CNET.COM, (Jan 9, 2009, 4:38
PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10139278-93.html. 
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Just as there is no societal value to false online reviews, the Supreme Court held
in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) that there is no constitutional value to false 
statements of fact. 
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burden of proof.7  The status of businesses as public or private figures 
for the purposes of online reviews is unclear at this time.  There are 
three notable results of this uncertainty: (1) defamation actions are 
less likely to be dismissed on the pleadings, (2) defamation cases 
settle more frequently, and (3) protected speech is more likely to be 
retracted.  The goal of this Note is to propose a clearer distinction 
between businesses that are public figures, and businesses that are 
private figures, resulting in a test that balances the First Amendment 
rights of online reviewers with the right of businesses to be protected 
from defamation.8 
Part II of this Note will discuss existing remedies for false and 
dishonest reviews, including the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”),9 the mandatory disclosure of material connections,10 and 
defamation law.  Part III of this Note will discuss the public figure 
doctrine.  Part IV of this Note will discuss the public figure doctrine 
as applied to businesses, and the problems and ambiguities that exist. 
Finally, Part V of this Note will compare the consequences of treating 
all businesses as public figures with the consequences of treating only 
some businesses as public figures, and will propose a new test based 
on the amount and type of online advertising in which a business 
engages. 
II. Current Remedies for False and Misleading Reviews
In outlining the current status of the law, this Note will first
discuss the prohibition of website liability under the CDA.11  Then, 
this Note will discuss the FTC regulation that governs reviews posted 
by businesses and their competitors, referred to here as the “Material 
Connections” Rule.12  Finally, this Note will discuss the current state 
7. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public figures must show
actual malice); cf. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (where the individual is a private 
figure and the matter is of public concern, the figure must show negligence for 
compensatory damages and actual malice for punitive damages); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (indicating that there is no First 
Amendment right to make defamatory statements about a private figure involving a 
matter that does not involve public concern). 
8. See, e.g, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
Each of these cases balances First Amendment rights with the right to avoid defamation. 
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (granting website hosts statutory immunity from liability
for content that they make available online but do not directly create). 
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230
11. Id.
12. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (West 2010).
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of defamation jurisprudence as it applies to actions brought against 
third party reviewers. 
A. Communications Decency Act
Before discussing reviewer liability, it is helpful to explain the
laws governing website liability.  The CDA distinguishes between two 
different types of website operators: “information content providers,” 
and “interactive computer services.” 13  Information content providers, 
such as online newspapers, are treated as the publisher or speaker of 
the information contained on the site.14  Thus, they are held liable for 
any defamatory statements.15  Interactive computer services, such as 
online discussion sites, are not liable for content that they make 
available, but do not create,16 such as content posted by users.17  This 
remains true even if they perform “traditional editorial functions—
such as electing to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter the 
content.”18 
The reason for this distinction is articulated in the findings and 
policy goals found at the beginning of the CDA.19  Interactive 
computer services promote unique diversity of information and 
opinion.20  Furthermore, they have previously flourished in the 
absence of government regulation.21  Thus, to encourage the 
continued development of interactive media,22 Congress made a 
policy decision to avoid imposing tort liability “on companies that 
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages.”23 
13. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
15. Id.
16. See Elizabeth A. Ritvo, Jeffrey P. Hermes & Samantha L. Gerlovin, Online
Forums and Chat Rooms in Defamation Actions, 24 COMM. LAWYER, Summer 2006, at 1, 
17 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230). 
17. See, e.g., Novak v. Overture Services, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding that Google was an “interactive computer service” and not a “information 
content provider” for the purposes of failing to remove allegedly objectionable content 
from its online discussion groups). 
18. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
20. Id. at (a)(3).
21. Id. at (a)(4).
22. Id. at (b)(1).
23. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Inability to sue the website host as a result of the CDA can make 
it difficult for defamation plaintiffs to track down online reviewers.24  
However, online review sites typically require reviewers to provide a 
name and email address before posting to the message board.25  
Defamation plaintiffs can then subpoena this information about 
particular reviewers at the onset of litigation.26  This prevents 
reviewer anonymity from precluding defamation actions. 
B. The “Material Connections” Rule
Potentially false or dishonest business reviews can be separated
into three categories: affiliate reviews, competitor reviews, and third 
party reviews.  Affiliate reviews include, for example, those written 
by a business owner, an employee, or someone paid by the business to 
write a positive review.  These reviews are likely to be falsely 
positive.27  Competitor reviews are those written by individuals 
affiliated with competing businesses.  These reviews are likely to be 
falsely negative.28  Third party reviews are those written by a neutral 
third party, such as a customer. 
The FTC has addressed the first category (reviews by business 
affiliates), and potentially the second category (reviews by 
competitors), in its material connections rule.  Pursuant to this 
regulation, a reviewer in an online message board must “clearly and 
conspicuously disclose her relationship” to the company she is 
reviewing because it “likely would affect the weight or credibility” of 
her review.29 
The regulation targets endorsements, defined as “any advertising 
message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, 
beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring 
advertiser.”30  Therefore, an employee who posts a positive review 
24. Ritvo et al., supra note 16, at 1.
25. See John Wilson, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between
Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 544 (2002). 
26. Id.
27. See Tobias J. Butler, The Realities of Relying on Doctor-Patient Non-Disclosure
Agreements for Reputational Protection, HEALTH LAWYER, June 2010, at 23, 27 
(discussing four types of posts: (1) positive and accurate, (2) negative and accurate, (3) 
positive and inaccurate, and (4) negative and inaccurate). 
28. See id.
29. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, Example 8 (West 2010) (providing that disclosure would be
required where, for example, an employee of a “leading playback device” manufacturer 
advocates for that manufacturer’s product in an “online message board designated for 
discussions of new music download technology”). 
30. Id. at § 255.0.
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about her employer’s product or service online would have to disclose 
her employment status because her review constitutes an 
endorsement.31  Conversely, a nonaffiliated third-party consumer who 
writes a positive online review is not required to make any disclosures 
because her review is not an endorsement.32 
Whether this regulation would require an affiliate of a competing 
business to disclose her employment status is unclear.  While it would 
“materially affect the weight or credibility” of the review,33 it is 
unclear whether this type of a review would constitute an 
endorsement.  On one hand, the term “endorsement” connotes a 
positive review, and the examples listed all discuss positive reviews.34  
On the other, writing a negative review for a competitor could also be 
construed as a type of positive advertisement, which would make 
disclosure necessary.  Regardless, even if competitor reviews were not 
covered by this regulation, a business could still file a defamation 
action.  Although requiring disclosure of this relationship would be an 
easier way to prevent competitor reviews from misleading consumers, 
a business may find it easier to convince a jury that a review written 
by a competitor was false, or written with actual malice.35 
While the First Amendment creates a presumption against 
governmental regulation of speech,36 the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the government may regulate commercial speech 
because it tends to be false or misleading.37  Although there is some 
debate as to whether this particular regulation is overbroad,38 most 
endorsements are likely to fall under the purview of commercial 
31. Id. at § 255.5, Example 8.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The 9 examples discussed: (1) advertisers who fund research that supports their
products; (2) a film star who endorses a food product; (3) a famous athlete who 
unofficially endorses a product; (4) a physician who vouches for a product; (5) 
spontaneous interviews of restaurant customers; (6) individuals compensated to provide a 
consumer endorsement of a product; (7) a blogger known as a video game expert who 
endorses a new game; (8) an employee participating in an online review board discussion 
about his or her company’s products; (9) individuals compensated to advertise products on 
the street.  Id. at § 255.0, Examples 1–9. 
35. As would be required if the business was a public figure.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression . . . . The government may ban forms 
of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” (citations omitted)). 
38. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ortiz, Consumer Speech and the Constitutional Limits of
FTC Regulations of “New Media,” 10 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 936 (2010).
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speech and thus do not pose the same constitutional questions as 
third party consumer reviews, or other reviews that do not constitute 
commercial speech. 
C. Defamation Law
A defamation action is the private remedy for false or misleading
online reviews.  To establish defamation, a business must show:39 (1) a 
false and defamatory statement of fact concerning the business;40 (2) 
unprivileged publication of that statement to a third party;41 (3) the 
requisite degree of fault;42 and (4) harmful nature of the statement.43 
When a business brings a defamation action based on a negative 
review, the second and fourth prongs are fairly simple to establish. 
Posting a statement on the internet is “publication” within the 
meaning of defamation law.44  Further, it is a matter of common sense 
that negative reviews harm a business’ reputation.  The ambiguities 
arise in establishing the first and third prongs, as they invoke First 
Amendment protections. 
39. Although defamation is typically a matter of state tort law, the requisite elements
tend to be substantially similar from state to state.  See, e.g., 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY TORTS 
§ 529 (10th ed. 2005) (summarizing California defamation elements as “(a) a publication
that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency
to injure or that causes special damage.”); Id. at § 535 (describing “published” as
“communicated to some third person who understands its defamatory meaning and
application to the plaintiff”); Id. at §§ 602–607 (discussing varying degrees of fault); 14
N.Y. PRACTICE, NEW YORK LAW OF TORTS § 1:42 (2010) (listing the elements of
defamation as (1) a false an injurious statement of fact concerning the plaintiff, (2)
publication to a third party by the defendant, (3) depending on the status of the plaintiff
and defendant, made with malice, recklessness, gross negligence, or made negligently or
innocently, (4) special damages or presumed harm in per se actionable cases).
40. See, e.g., 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY TORTS § 529 (10th ed. 2005) (California law
requires a statement that is false and defamatory); 14 N.Y. PRACTICE, N. Y. LAW OF 
TORTS § 1:42 (2010)  (New York law requires a false and injurious statement of fact). 
41. “Publication of defamatory matter is its communication intentionally or by a
negligent act to one other than other person defamed.” RESTATAMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 577 (1977). 
42. The Restatement discusses fault under its discussion of publication, which it
defines as “communication intentionally or by a negligent act” to one other than other 
person defamed.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977) (emphasis added). 
Discussion of the requisite degree of fault in online business reviews will be discussed infra 
in Part II. C. 2. i. and ii. 
43. Id. at § 558.
44. A statement posted on an online message board is “published” for the purposes
of defamation law.  See Wilson, supra note 25, at 558 (citing Giorgio Bovenzi, Liability of 
Systems Operators on the Internet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 119 (1996)). 
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1. Opinion Versus Fact
Whereas a speaker can be liable for false statements of fact, the
First Amendment protects statements of opinion.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that, “under the First Amendment there is no such 
thing as a false idea.  However pernicious an opinion may seem, one 
depends for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries 
but on the competition of other ideas.  But there is no constitutional 
value in false statements of fact.”45  Therefore, only those statements 
that a reasonable person would interpret to state a fact can constitute 
defamation.46 
The Restatement of Torts, which has incorporated First 
Amendment jurisprudence into its guidelines, provides that a 
statement may be actionable for defamation whenever a reasonable 
person interprets it to state a defamatory fact,47 or to imply an 
undisclosed defamatory fact as the basis for an opinion.48 
It is likely that many harmful statements made in online review 
sites constitute mere opinion that is not actionable.49  Some review 
sites post disclaimers to this effect, warning viewers that all of their 
content is merely reviewer opinion.50  Since the opinion versus fact 
distinction is based on a reasonable person, the existence of 
disclaimers and the general tone of the message board can affect 
whether a statement is considered defamatory.51  However, sometimes 
the line between opinion and fact is difficult to draw. 
Consider the following hypothetical reviews of a barber shop on 
an online message board.  One reviewer writes that he did not like the 
haircut that he received, and thinks that the barber is unskilled.  A 
second reviewer writes that he saw the barber use the same comb on 
two different customers, and notes that this is a health code violation. 
45. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
46. See Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565 (1977).
48. See id. at § 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the
form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the 
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.”). 
49. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 25, at 567 (citing Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing
John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cybersbace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 919 (2000) (arguing 
that, in large part, the online audience views Internet discourse as mere “rhetorical 
hyperbole or subjective speculation rather than a sober recitation of actual facts”)). 
50. Wilson, supra note 25, at 567 (for example, Yahoo financial message boards
contain the following disclaimer: “These messages are only the opinion of the poster, are 
no substitute for your own research, and should not be relied upon for trading or any 
other purpose.”). 
51. See id. at 559.
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A third reviewer writes that the barber schedules too many 
appointments at once, and that as a result he was rushed and received 
a poor quality haircut. 
The first review is clearly opinion, since it does not state or imply 
any defamatory fact.  The second review would probably be found to 
state defamatory fact, since it accuses the barber of a specific action 
that constitutes a health code violation.  However, the third review is 
more ambiguous.  It accuses the barber of over-scheduling, which the 
barber may consider to be a defamatory fact.  However, how much 
time is required for an appointment, what feels rushed, and how this 
affects the quality of a haircut are all likely to be considered matters 
of opinion that cannot be proven or disproven. 
2. Establishing Fault
The level of fault required to establish defamation depends on the
speaker and the nature of the statement.  The Supreme Court has 
found that the First Amendment affords extra protection to speech 
about public figures and matters of public concern.52  Therefore, the 
requisite degree of fault in a defamation action depends first on 
whether the plaintiff is classified as a “public figure”53 or a “private 
figure.”54  Whereas public figures and public officials must prove that 
a review was made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of 
the truth,55 private figures are held to a lesser standard (which varies 
depending on the nature of the statement).56  The level of fault that a 
business must show to establish defamation therefore depends on 
whether the business is classified as a public or a private figure. 
III. The Public Figure Doctrine
First Amendment jurisprudence imposes three potential fault 
standards in defamation actions.  For public figures, the standard is 
actual malice, regardless of whether the speech involves a matter of 
public concern.57  For private figures, there are three possible 
standards.  Where the speech involves a private figure, and is about a 
matter of public concern, the minimum standard is negligence for 
52. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. Id.
54. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
55. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
56. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
57. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
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compensatory damages, and actual malice for punitive damages.58  
However, where the speech is about a private figure and does not 
involve a matter of public concern, First Amendment jurisprudence 
imposes no restraints on state tort law standards.59  These standards 
are indicated in the chart below. 
Public Figure Private Figure 
Public 
Concern 
Actual Malice60 Compensatory Damages- Negligence 
Punitive Damages- Actual Malice61 
No Public 
Concern 
Actual Malice62 No First Amendment Constraints63 
A. Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figures
The Supreme Court has identified three categories of public
figures.64  In differentiating between the three different types of public 
figures and private figures, the two most relevant factors seem to be 
the individual’s relationship to a public controversy,65 and that 
individual’s access to the media or other channels of communication.66 
First, there are general purpose public figures, which “occupy 
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are 
deemed public figures for all purposes.”67  These figures are 
“intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions 
or, by reason of their fame, shape events of concern to society at 
58. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (Gertz provides that states must impose some degree of
fault, however, so strict liability is not an option). 
59. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
60. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 .
61. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 .
62. See New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
63. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749.
64. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)
(note that while it is not the majority opinion in Curtis, Chief Justice Warren’s 
concurrence is commonly cited as the emerging precedent.  See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
335.);  Gertz, 418 U.S.  at 345. 
65. Gertz, 418 U.S.  at 345.
66. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
67. Curtis, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (note that while it is
not the majority opinion in Curtis, Chief Justice Warren’s concurrence is commonly cited 
as the emerging precedent.  See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335.). 
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large.”68 Because they are prominent but politically unaccountable, 
society “has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of 
such persons.”69  Therefore, these individuals must accept public 
scrutiny as a necessary consequence of their involvement in public 
affairs.70  For example, in Hustler v. Falwell, Jerry Falwell, “a 
nationally known minister who ha[d] been active as a commentator 
on politics and public affairs,” was a public figure for the purposes of 
a parody published in Hustler magazine.71 
Next, there are limited-purpose public figures, which “thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order 
to influence the resolution of the issues involved.”72  By injecting 
themselves into public debate, these public figures invite attention 
and comment in a way that private individuals do not.73  For example, 
in Associated Press v. Walker, the Court found that Walker, an 
individual who had made his career opposing physical intervention by 
federal marshals in political activity, was a public figure for the 
purposes of an article about federal military intervention in a riot.74 
Finally, Gertz recognized the possibility that someone could 
involuntarily become a public figure “through no purposeful action of 
his own.”75  However, the Court cautioned that this type of public 
figure must be “exceedingly rare,” and noted “for the most part, 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of special prominence 
in the affairs of society.”76  For example, the D.C. Circuit found an air 
traffic controller who was on duty during a famous crash was an 
involuntary public figure for the purposes of a news article covering 
the crash.77  The United States Supreme Court has never recognized 
an involuntary public figure. 
Individuals who are not public figures are private figures.  Private 
figures have a lower burden because the Court has found a state’s 
interest in protecting private individuals from defamatory speech 
68. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337.
69. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163–64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
70. Gertz, 418 U.S.  at 344.
71. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,  47 (1988).
72. Gertz, 418 U.S.  at 345.
73. Id.
74. 388 U.S. 130, 136 (1967) (note that Walker was decided with Curtis, and does not
have a separate citation). 
75. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
76. Id.
77. Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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outweighs the First Amendment rights of the speaker.78  For example, 
in Gertz v. Welch, a lawyer representing one party in a high-profile 
police shooting case was not a public figure for the purpose of an 
article falsely accusing him of being a “Lenninist” and a “Communist-
fronter,” among other things.79  The Court found that even though he 
was “well known in some circles” as the result of his involvement in 
“community and professional affairs,” he was a purely private figure 
because he did not engage the public’s attention in an attempt to 
influence the outcome of a particular issue.80 
In both Curtis and Gertz, the Court emphasized access to media 
as the primary means for public figures to address criticism.81  In 
Curtis, the Court stated that, “as a class, these ‘public figures’ have as 
ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, 
both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their own views 
and activities.”82  Similarly, in Gertz, the Court found “public officials 
and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the 
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic 
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals 
normally enjoy.”83  Therefore, private individuals are more vulnerable 
to injury, and “more deserving of recovery.”84 
However, media resulting from a tort cannot make the plaintiff a 
public figure for the purposes of that tort.85  “Clearly, those charged 
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own 
defense by making the claimant a public figure.”86  In Hutchinson, the 
Court found that when a senator gave a mock award to a federally 
funded researcher for demonstrating egregious and wasteful 
government spending, the researcher was not a limited public figure 
for the purpose of federal grants.87  The researcher had not invited the 
necessary degree of “public attention and comment” on the issue, and 
he had no “regular and continuing” access to the media.88  
Furthermore, the media and controversy resulting from the award 
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. 348.
79. Id. at 325–26.
80. Id. at 352.
81. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
82. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
83. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
84. Id.
85. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 411, 431 (1979).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 417, 431.
88. Id. at 432.
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could not make the researcher a public figure for the purposes of that 
award.89 
B. Public Versus Private Concern
In addition to considering whether the plaintiff is a public or a
private figure, the Court has considered whether there exists a matter 
of public concern.  However, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“the boundaries of speech on matters of public concern are not well 
defined.”90  Speech is on a matter of public concern when it can “be 
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other 
concern to the community,”91 or when it “is a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public.”92  However, “a 
statement’s arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial character . . . is 
irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public 
concern.’”93  The court looks to the content, form and context of the 
speech to determine whether it is of a matter of public or private 
concern.94  No one factor is dispositive.95 
Whereas public figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice 
regardless of whether the speech in question is on a matter of public 
concern,96 the standard for private figure plaintiffs varies depending 
on whether the speech involves a matter of public concern.  In Gertz 
v. Welch, where the plaintiff was a private figure, and the speech
involved a matter of public concern, the Court held that actual malice
was required to recover punitive damages, and some degree of fault
(presumably negligence) was required to recover compensatory
damages.97  However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., where the plaintiff was a private figure and no matter
of public concern existed, the Court found that no showing of actual
malice was required for the recovery of punitive damages,98 and
implied that recovery for such speech was not constrained by the First
Amendment.
89. Id. at 431.
90. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011). 
91. Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
92. Id. (citing San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)).
93. Id. (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, 387 (1987)).
94. Id. (citing Dun, 472 U.S. at 761).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. at 349.
98. 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
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IV. Application of the Public Figure Standard to Businesses
A. Three Case Studies
1. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. (“the corporation”) manufactures and
sells commercial fishing boats.99  The Globe newspaper published 
several articles reporting defects in the boats, and attributed the 
sinking of two corporation-made boats to these defects.100  The 
corporation filed a defamation suit against the Globe, alleging both 
negligent and intentional libel.101 
The district court found that corporations are public figures 
because, first, they enjoy access to the channels of communication, 
and second, they “voluntarily place before the public an issue of some 
importance regarding the quality and integrity of their products,” and 
“generally promote the sale of their products to the public by 
engaging in some form of advertising.”102 
The First Circuit reversed, finding that not all corporations are 
public figures for two reasons.103  First, the court found that “to the 
extent that access to the channels of communication is a meaningful 
factor . . . corporations have no particular advantage over private 
individuals.”104  Second, the court found that a business does not 
thrust itself into a public controversy by merely selling products.105 
The court gave three more relevant factors that courts should take 
into consideration in determining whether a corporation is a public 
figure: (1) whether the controversy that gave rise to the defamation is 
public or private, (2) whether the controversy preexisted the 
statements at issue,  (3) the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s 
participation in the controversy.106 
In applying these factors, the court refused to extend public figure 
status to include all reasonably successful manufacturers, merchants, 
and professionals.107  The court found “no public controversy 
surrounding the publication of the Globe articles” and contrasted the 
99. Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 589.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 589–90.
106. Id. at 583.
107. Id. at 592
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situation with one where the public was actually discussing a matter.108  
The court then remanded to the district court to find whether a public 
controversy implicating the company existed apart from the 
challenged statements, and whether the “prominence, power, or 
involvement of the company in respect to the controversy, or its 
public efforts to influence the results of such controversy—were such 
as to merit public figure treatment.”109 
2. Vegod Corporation v. American Broadcasting Companies
Vegod Corporation closes out stores that are going out of
business.110  It ran a closing out sale for an old, well-known, and 
respected department store.111  ABC broadcasted a story in which a 
Better Business Bureau spokesman criticized the quality of goods 
sold at the closeout.112  Vegod sued for defamation, and ABC claimed 
that Vegod was a public figure and thus required to prove actual 
malice.113 
The California Supreme Court found that while the quality of 
goods for sale was a matter of public interest, “criticism of 
commercial conduct does not deserve the special protection of the 
actual malice test.”114  Therefore, “a person in the business world 
advertising his wares does not necessarily become part of an existing 
public controversy.”115 
3. Gilbert v. Sykes
Dr. Sykes is a prominent professor and practitioner of plastic and
reconstructive surgery at a prestigious medical institution in 
Sacramento, California.116  Sykes has written numerous articles on 
plastic surgery, appeared in local television shows on the subject and 
advertised in the Sacramento media market.117  Top Doctors, a 
Sacramento magazine, credited him as “a nationally recognized 
educator and leader in minimally invasive esthetic and laser surgery 
[,] [who] has performed over 10,000 surgical procedures, is board-
108. Id. at 591.
109. Id.
110. Vegod Corp. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 765 (1979).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 766.
114. Id. at 770.
115. Id.
116. Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 17, 23 (2007).
117. Id. at 23.
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certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic surgery, and has 
published three books and over 90 articles on facial plastic surgery.”118 
After Sykes performed a series of cosmetic facial procedures on 
Georgette Gilbert, she sued him for malpractice and posted negative 
reviews about her experience on a website she created, entitled 
www.mysurgerynightmare.com.119  On this website, Gilbert included 
before and after photographs, and wrote “I was told by my doctor 
that this was a good result—that I looked better after his surgery—
what do you think?”120  She also said that Sykes told her that she 
would look natural after the surgery and that she was under the 
impression the change would be subtle, but that the “surgery was the 
biggest regret of [her] life.”121 
Sykes cross-complained against Gilbert for defamation.  He 
claimed that the photographs on the website were misleading, 
because the “after” photographs were taken after significant 
additional cosmetic surgery procedures performed by someone else.122  
Furthermore, Sykes claimed that the website falsely indicated that he 
performed procedures that Gilbert did not need or want, misstated 
the content of their communications, and falsely suggested that he 
was compensated for the procedures “under the table.”123 
The trial court found that Sykes was a limited-purpose public 
figure.124  Thus, to prevail on a defamation claim, Sykes was required 
to prove not only that Gilbert’s claims were false, but that they were 
uttered with actual malice.125 
In determining whether Sykes was a public figure, the court stated 
that “first, there must be a public controversy, which means the issue 
was debated publicly and had foreseeable and substantial 
ramifications for nonparticipants.  Second, the plaintiff must have 
undertaken some voluntary act through which he or she sought to 
influence resolution of the public issue.”126  The court found that 
“plastic surgery is a subject of widespread public interest and 
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 18–19.
120. Id. at 19–20.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id. at 21.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 24.
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discussion.”127  The court then held that Sykes thrust himself into that 
debate by: (1) appearing on local television shows, (2) writing 
numerous articles in medical journals and beauty magazines on the 
subject, (3) testifying as an expert witness in the field of plastic 
surgery, and (4) advertising his services in the local media.128 
B. Problems and Ambiguities in the Public Figure Doctrine as Applied to
Businesses for the Purpose of Online Business Reviews
The current public versus private figure distinction was developed
for individuals, particularly those who are actively involved in 
political debates.  Remember, for example, the case of Associated 
Press v. Walker, where an activist made a career opposing physical 
intervention by federal marshals into political activity, thus becoming 
a public figure for the purposes of an article about federal military 
intervention in a riot.129  However, the two main factors that courts 
have considered in distinguishing between public and private figures, 
injection into a public debate and access to media, are not necessarily 
applicable to businesses. 
First, the “injection into public debate” or “intimate involvement 
in the resolution of public affairs” formulation is difficult to apply to 
businesses.  For Dr. Sykes, it was fairly simple, since plastic surgery is 
more controversial than most business activities, and he did far more 
than most businesses or practitioners to inject himself into that debate 
by writing articles, appearing on television, testifying in trials, and 
advertising aggressively.  However, with typical businesses, it is 
difficult to identify a particular public controversy into which the 
business has injected itself.  This is true even of businesses that are 
almost certainly public figures.  For example, while Apple may not 
necessarily have injected itself into any particular debate, the 
company’s notoriety would almost certainly seem to make it a limited 
purpose public figure for the purposes of its products, if not a general 
purpose public figure. 
One potential counterargument is the one rejected by Bruno & 
Stillman and Vegod Corporation—that the quality of services or 
products is always a public controversy into which businesses inject 
themselves by offering and advertising those services or products. 
127. Id. at 23 (noting that “Elective cosmetic surgery was the subject of the popular
television series Extreme Makeover, in which it is portrayed as a positive, life-transforming 
event.  Yet the widespread and indiscriminate use of plastic surgery by celebrities and the 
public has also generated a firestorm of negative publicity and comment.”). 
128. Id. at 25.
129. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (1967).
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However, this is a strained adaptation of the rule.  Whereas the 
quality of goods and services may be a matter of public concern, it is 
not likely a public “controversy.” 
Regardless, both the stringent requirement of active injection into 
a public debate and the media/non-media distinction are inapposite in 
the case of businesses.  First, businesses don’t have the same privacy 
rights as private citizens, which is the primary purpose of the public 
controversy requirement.130  Second, businesses have access to online 
forums and can rebut assertions, which is the core purpose of the 
media/non-media distinction.131  Third, online reviews have the ability 
to reach a mass audience like traditional forms of media.132 
V. A Proposed Line Based on Advertising
A. Competing Constitutional Considerations
In creating a more workable public figure standard for businesses
in the context of online reviews, there appears to be four competing 
constitutional considerations.  First, there is the right of consumers to 
receive truthful information.133  Second, there is the right of 
individuals to share their opinion,134 and to do so anonymously.135  
Third, there is the right of businesses to protect their reputation.136  
Finally, there is the concern that businesses will use their resources to 
chill harmful protected speech.137 
130. Wilson, supra note 25, at 560.
131. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (however, the court noted that “an
opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood”). 
132. Wilson, supra note 25, at 560.
133. This is at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine.  See Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (noting that for this reason, 
“[t]he Constitution therefore affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to 
other constitutionally guaranteed expression . . . . The government may ban forms of 
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it” (citations omitted)). 
134. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (“However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition 
of other ideas.”). 
135. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 846 (1997) (finding that the CDA’s “indecent
transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions violated the First Amendment). 
136. Businesses, like individuals, have a right not to be defamed.  This is the core of
defamation law. 
137. See, e.g., state anti-SLAPP statutes (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation).  For example, in 1992 the California legislature enacted an anti-SLAPP 
statute “which provided broad authority to strike a complaint based on an act of free 
speech ‘in connection with a public issue’ unless the court determined the plaintiff had 
established, by credible evidence, ‘a probability [that it would] prevail on the claim.’” 
Wilson, supra note 25, at 572. 
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Different scenarios present different constitutional problems.  For 
example, where a malicious reviewer defames a small mom and pop 
store that relies on positive Yelp reviews, there is a concern that the 
business will not be able to adequately protect its reputation. 
However, there is little risk that the store will use its resources to chill 
protected speech.  Conversely, where a well-meaning individual 
writes a negative review about service received by a large 
corporation, there is a concern that the corporation will threaten 
litigation to bully the reviewer into retracting the speech, thus 
infringing on the First Amendment rights of the reviewer. 
B. Settlement: A Practical Consideration
In creating a more workable public versus private figure standard,
it is also important to consider the impact that it may have on the 
settlement of future defamation actions.  Because online business 
reviews are often not a matter on which parties want to spend large 
amounts of money litigating, defamation actions for these reviews 
often settle.  The benefit of settlement is that it prevents these cases 
from congesting court dockets.  The downside is that in a settlement, 
a business often has more power than a reviewer, and is more likely 
to bully a reviewer into retracting protected speech.  The clearer the 
standard, the more likely that claims will be resolved on the 
pleadings, and the less likely that settlement of weak claims will 
occur. 
C. A Workable Balance: The Two Options
In creating any standard, courts are often faced with the choice
between drawing a bright line rule or imposing a multi-factor 
retroactive balancing test.  Defining the public figure standard as it 
applies to online business reviews is no different.  On one hand, 
courts could decide that either all businesses are public figures for the 
purposes of online business reviews.  On the other, courts could 
decide that only some businesses are properly labeled as public 
figures whereas others are private figures, and attempt to draw a line 
distinguishing the two.  Below, this Note will analyze the downsides 
and benefits of each, and propose somewhat of a hybrid—a balancing 
test based on advertising. 
1. Bright Line Rule
Under this option, the quality of available goods and services
would be treated as a public controversy, and all businesses that offer 
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goods and services would be seen as thrusting themselves into that 
controversy. 
There are three main benefits to this approach.  First, it is a 
simple and clear standard.  It would produce a chain of positive 
results.  With a clear standard, judges could more easily dismiss non-
meritorious cases on the pleadings.  As a result, cases involving 
protected speech are less likely to settle.  Therefore, protected speech 
is less likely to be silenced.  Second, finding that all businesses are 
public figures would prevent reviewers from being liable for negligent 
misstatements of fact.  If viewers are concerned that they will be 
liable for negligent misstatements of fact, they are less likely to review 
businesses at all.  If they do review businesses, they are more likely to 
refrain from sharing their entire experience.  Thus, this standard 
would encourage honest and more frequent reviews.  Finally, the 
higher burden would protect more speech on the border of opinion 
and fact. 
The adoption of a bright line rule would further three of the four 
competing constitutional considerations: the right of consumers to 
receive truthful information, the right of individuals to state their 
opinion anonymously, and the concern that corporations will chill 
speech by bullying individual reviewers.  However, it does little to 
protect the right of businesses to protect their reputation in the face 
of defamatory remarks.  The actual malice standard would make it 
nearly impossible for the mom and pop store to recover for 
defamation, even in the face of a debilitating misstatement of fact. 
2. Retroactive Balancing Test
Under this option, courts would continue to use some sort of test
to distinguish between businesses that are public figures, and 
businesses that are private figures. 
There are two main benefits to this approach.  First, it arguably 
more fairly distinguishes between different types of businesses (the 
large corporation and the mom and pop store, for example).  Second, 
it makes recovery possible for smaller local businesses who may be 
materially harmed by defamatory reviews.  Depending on where the 
line was drawn and how effectively this line protected truthful speech, 
a balancing test could adequately protect both the rights of businesses 
to guard their reputations against defamatory speech, and the right of 
individuals to share their opinions. 
However, like with any retroactive balancing test, there are 
downsides to this approach.  It is difficult for courts to distinguish 
between businesses that are public and private figures, and to create a 
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line that accurately depicts that difference.  For example, even if it 
were admitted that large corporations are public figures, and mom 
and pop stores are not, this still leaves many businesses of varying 
size, notoriety, wealth, and many other factors in the middle. 
The likely result, as with the current test, is that parties will not 
know whether a business is a public figure until the matter is litigated. 
This wastes both time and money, and makes it more likely that cases 
will settle, since individual reviewers are unwilling to risk the time 
and money required to litigate when they can merely retract the 
contested statement.  Therefore, this approach can increase the 
possibility that businesses will chill speech by bullying reviewers. 
3. Compromise: A Simple Rule Based on Advertising
The ideal test would provide a clear and fair distinction between
public and private figure businesses.  As a result, small private 
businesses would not be precluded from recovering for truly harmful 
and defamatory speech, while reviewers would not be bullied into 
removing truthful or opinion speech about businesses that are public 
figures. 
This would first require abandoning the existing formulation, 
which is geared towards individuals and political involvement, and 
does not accurately or efficiently delineate those businesses that seem 
like they should be public figures.  Then, it requires finding a simple 
distinction between public and private figure businesses.  Although 
there are many other factors about a business that a court could 
potentially take into consideration, an overly complicated and 
arbitrary test would still result in increased settlement, and thus an 
increased risk that protected speech would be removed. 
This proposed compromise is a test based on online advertising. 
Where businesses advertise online, they inject themselves into the 
online discourse about their products and services, thereby inviting 
criticism.  This is reminiscent of the “thrust into a public controversy” 
test, as advertising can be seen as a way that businesses thrust 
themselves into the public discourse about a particular product. 
However, drawing a clear line based on online advertising prevents 
courts from having to individually determine whether a public 
controversy exists, and whether a business has injected itself into that 
controversy. 
This test also establishes a clear enough standard where non-
meritorious cases brought merely to silence speech could be resolved 
on the pleadings before reviewers agreed to retract protected speech. 
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Finally, this test gives businesses a choice.  If a business wants to 
enter the quality of its products and services into the public discourse, 
it can advertise them online.  But in doing so, the business assumes 
the risk that consumers will not like its products and will either voice 
negative opinions, or make negligent misstatements of fact, for which 
the business would have no remedy.  Conversely, if a business wants 
to remain private, it can choose not to advertise online, thereby 
refusing to invite any online criticism. 
Targeting online advertising in particular, as opposed to all 
advertising, serves two main purposes.  First, it protects businesses 
that are not online and thus unable to respond to online reviews. 
Second, it prevents mom and pop businesses, whose only advertising 
is perhaps a coupon or an ad in a local paper, from being bullied by 
negative reviews. 
Although clarity is a valuable aspect of this test, there should 
probably be an exception for de minimus online advertising where it 
is clear that a business’s presence online is minimal, and that the 
business is not a member of the online community such that it should 
be able to respond to negative reviews.  For example, if a mom and 
pop store pays the local newspaper to post an advertisement, which 
appears in the online version of the paper, this may not be a sufficient 
online presence to trigger this public figure test. 
VI. Conclusion
Modern consumers look to online business review sites to guide 
their selection of goods and services.  As a result, online business 
reviews are becoming increasingly important in defining a business’s 
reputation.  When a business identifies a false consumer review, its 
remedy is to file a defamation suit.  However, the defamation 
standard today is unclear insofar as it applies to businesses.  If a 
business is a public figure, then it must show that a review was written 
with actual malice (reckless disregard for the truth or knowledge of 
falsity) before it can recover for defamation.  If, however, a business 
is a private figure, the level of fault that it must prove is lower. 
The current public figure test looks to whether the business has 
thrust itself into a public controversy, and whether it has access to 
media.  However, this standard was developed for individuals and 
seems inapposite when evaluating businesses.  Furthermore, the 
“access to media” aspect may no longer be relevant, given the vast 
availability of the internet. 
As a result of these ambiguities, public figure status is somewhat 
arbitrary, and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  This results in 
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an increase in the number of cases that settle, because reviewers are 
unwilling to spend the time or money to litigate these issues, and 
would prefer to retract contested posts.  However, this means that 
sometimes, protected speech is silenced for the sake of expediency. 
This Note proposes a different test more tailored to businesses. 
Under this test, businesses who choose to advertise their goods and 
services online voluntarily invite comment and criticism about the 
quality of those goods and services.  Therefore, they become public 
figures for the purposes of online business reviews.  Conversely, 
businesses that do not advertise themselves online retain private 
figure status and do not have to meet the heightened standard of 
actual malice.  The simplicity of this test allows for dismissal on the 
pleadings in non-meritorious cases, thus preventing businesses from 
bullying individuals from removing protected reviews. 
